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State v. Stephenson' provides sound guidance as to two impor-
tant jury selection procedures. The first related to the trial judge's
excusing twelve members of the petit jury venire who had served on
a jury three days before the instant case was tried. The ultimate jury
venire contained only thirty-six of the original fifty-six available
names, and defense counsel contended that the judge's action had
infringed upon his right to trial by jury. In holding that the trial judge
had properly exercised his discretionary authority to excuse jury ven-
iremen, Justice Dixon relied upon State v. Jugger where the good
faith excusing of over half of the venire (32 out of 50) was upheld. As
in Jugger, there had been no collusion, fraud or abuse of discretion
in Stephenson. It is inevitable that a jury venire, with the names
selected at random and by lot, will include many prospective jurors
who are disqualified, claim an exemption or have some legitimate
excuse for not serving. Some courts very wisely instruct the jury
commission to send out qualification forms to all persons whose
names are drawn for jury service, so that those clearly disqualified or
claiming proper exemptions may be deleted from the venire list.,
Such forms, however, do not entirely solve the problems, since there
will still be qualified, non-exempt jurors who present a legitimate
excuse from jury service.
A second, even more important, holding in Stephenson clearly
points up the procedures to be followed on voir dire examination.
Under article 786 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the prospective
juror is first examined by the state and the defense. Article 788 pro-
vides: "After the examination provided by Article 786, a prospective
juror shall be tendered first to the state, which shall accept or chal-
lenge him." Next he shall be tendered to the defense for acceptance
or challenge. The Louisiana supreme court overruled defense coun-
sel's contention that the state must accept or challenge the juror
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 291 So. 2d 767 (La. 1974).
2. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 783 provides in part: "The court may excuse a member
of the petit jury venire at any time prior to the time he is sworn as a juror to try a
particular case. The panel shall be selected from the remaining members of the petit
jury venire."
3. 217 La. 687, 47 So. 2d 46 (1950).
4. Such qualification forms are provided for in the Federal Jury Service and
Selection Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C.A. §1864(a).
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before he is tendered to the state for voir dire questioning. It is after
the voir dire examination by both the state and the defendant is
completed, that the state and the defendant must accept or challenge
the juror under article 788. The order of these procedures, which is a
logical interpretation of articles 786 and 788, is clearly stated in Jus-
tice Dixon's opinion.
A number of other decisions further point the way to the appro-
priate scope of voir dire interrogation of prospective jurors. In State
v. Prieurl the Louisiana supreme court held that it was proper to
question prospective jurors as to whether they would tend to believe
testimony of a police officer, rather than that of the defendant who
was charged with armed robbery. Ordinarily, a juror's pre-disposition
to place extra faith in the veracity and dependability of police testi-
mony would not constitute a challenge for cause, but it might well
be a reason for a peremptory challenge of the juror. In Prieur, how-
ever, refusal to allow such a question was held not to be reversible
error, since counsel had thoroughly probed the juror's minds by other
questions as to the credibility they would attach to a police officer's
testimony as against that of other witnesses.
In State v. Fallon,' when a prospective juror stated that he had
heard quite a bit about the case, the trial judge disallowed defense
counsel's question as to what the juror had heard. In approving the
trial court's ruling, the Louisiana supreme court stressed the fact that
an answer to such a question would have brought hearsay testimony
before the selected jurors who were assembled in the courtroom. It
would seem to be very difficult to accurately weigh the effect of what
the prospective juror heard without knowing what he actually heard.
Possibly the selected jurors, and other prospective jurors, could have
been excluded from the courtroom while the answer was given, but
the impracticality of such a frequently recurring procedure probably
justified the way in which the matter was handled.
COMPULSORY PROCESS TO SECURE PRESENCE OF WITNESSES
The defendant's constitutional "right to a fair trial"7 includes
the right "to compel the attendance of witnesses," and the Code of
Criminal Procedure includes the provisions of the Uniform Act to
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Crimi-
nal Proceedings.8 The indigent defendant's right to secure out of state
5. 294 So. 2d 227 (La. 1974).
6. 290 So. 2d 273 (La. 1974).
7. LA. CONST. art. I, §16.
8. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 741-45.
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witnesses at the state's expense is conditioned, according to State v.
Chavers,l on a prior showing that the testimony sought is "material
and relevant." Defense counsel had argued that to require such a
disclosure was to compel the defendant to reveal part of his case in
derogation of his constitutional right to remain silent. In rejecting
this contention, the Louisiana supreme court pointed out that the
federal authorities10 "indicate that the defendant's constitutional
right not to incriminate himself is not infringed if he is required to
make some showing of necessity . . . for the subpoena of witnesses
at state expense."" While the assertion of one constitutional right
(compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses) cannot be
conditioned upon the forfeiture of another basic right (privilege
against self incrimination), such constitutional rights are relative,
and it is certainly appropriate to require some "showing of necessity."
WITNESSES -EFFECT OF VIOLATION OF SEQUESTRATION ORDER
The sequestration of witnesses awaiting their turn to testify is an
important device to insure truth from the witness stand by precluding
the possibility that a witness may adjust his testimony to that of
previous witnesses. Article 764 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
continued the right of the defense or the state to demand the seques-
tration of witnesses, but deleted a former provision for mandatory
disqualification of a witness who violates a sequestration order.,2 This
new provision has been interpreted as vesting the trial judge with
"broad discretion" to determine whether a witness who fails to com-
ply with a sequestration order shall be barred from testifying, cited
for contempt, or both." However, the court should be very cautious
about disqualifying a key witness where there has been no connivance
or fault in the violation by the party calling the witness.
In State v. Lewis, 4 a key witness, who was the victim of the
burglary, had only heard the prior testimony of a police officer which
established a foundation for introduction of photographs taken at the
scene of the crime. This testimony was largely unrelated to the sub-
stance of the witness' testimony, and was not likely to influence that
testimony. Justice Calogero stressed that the purpose of sequestra-
tion is "to insure that a witness will testify as to his own knowledge
9. 294 So. 2d 489, 493 (La. 1974), applying LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 741.
10. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
11. State v. Chavers, 294 So. 2d 489, 493 (La. 1974).
12. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 764, comment (b).
13. State v. Rouse, 256 La. 275, 286, 236 So. 2d 211, 214 (1970).
14. 288 So. 2d 324 (La. 1974).
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of the case without being influenced by the testimony of other wit-
nesses,' 5 and concluded,
[wihere, as here, a witness violates an order of sequestration and
hears testimony which bears little if any relationship to the mat-
ters about which she has been called to testify, the purpose of the
sequestration order has not been thwarted and we cannot say that
the Court's allowing the witness to testify under these circum-
stances was an abuse of discretion."
Conversely, in State v. Bernard,7 a witness was held to have been
properly disqualified, even though no connivance or bad faith was
shown, where she had listened to fifteen minutes of testimony in
direct contradiction to her testimony. In that case, there had been a
substantial danger that the witness' testimony would be influenced
by what she had heard. Justice Culpepper, sitting ad hoc, noted that
defense counsel, who stood to lose the witness' testimony, had been
at fault in not making sure that she knew of the sequestration order
violated. The majority stressed the additional consideration that no
great prejudice to the defendant's case had resulted, since the wit-
ness' testimony would merely have corroborated similar alibi testi-
mony given by her husband. 8 In the final analysis, it would appear
that Bernard is best justified as an exercise of the trial judge's wide
discretion, based upon many sometimes intangible factors, in deter-
mining whether to disqualify the witness, cite him for contempt
where the violation was intentional, apply both sanctions, or treat the
violation as a harmless irregularity.
IMPROPER CONSOLIDATION FOR TRIAL OF RELATED OFFENSES
Under article 706 of the Code of Criminal Procedure consolida-
tion for trial of separately charged offenses is only authorized upon
motion of the defendant, and where the consolidated offenses "could
have been joined in a single indictment." This stated limitation is
significant, since the Code joinder provisions generally prohibit the
charging of more than one crime in a single indictment.'9 In State v.
Peters"° the defendant had been jointly tried and convicted under
15. Id. at 327.
16. Id.
17. 287 So. 2d 770 (La. 1973).
18. Id. at 776.
19. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 493 (misjoinder of offenses - only very limited
joinder is authorized); art. 481 (joinder of multiple thefts); art. 482 (joinder of theft
and receiving stolen things).
20. 298 So. 2d 276 (La. 1974).
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bills of information which had separately charged armed robbery and
simple kidnapping. No pre-trial motion for severance or other objec-
tion to the joint trial had been urged, and the defendant objected to
the joint trial for the first time on appeal. The emphasis of the origi-
nal majority opinion was upon the absence of a contemporaneous
objection to the consolidation for trial and the failure to reserve a bill
of exceptions.2 Dissenting, Justice Barham contended that the im-
proper consolidation of offenses for trial was appealable as an error
that was "discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and
proceedings. ... 22
In the final analysis, the real issue was whether the unauthorized
joint trial was an irregularity which could be waived, or had been
waived, by defendant's failure to urge a timely objection prior to trial
and conviction. Justice Dixon's majority opinion on the rehearing
analogized the situation to improperly charging two crimes in a single
indictment, where the misjoinder can only be urged by a motion to
quash,23 and stated,
There is no substantial difference between a proceeding in-
volving one indictment charging two separate nonjoinable offen-
ses and a proceeding involving two indictments charging such
offenses. In each instance the prohibition against such a proce-
dure is grounded on the possible prejudice arising from a single
trial on two offenses . . . . The defects are not jurisdictional nor
do they constitute a denial of due process.24
If the crimes jointly tried had both been major felonies, triable
by twelve man juries, Justice Dixon's application, by analogy, of the
rule requiring timely objection to misjoinder in the indictment to
objections to unauthorized joint trial of separately charged crimes,
fills in an apparent gap in the stated Code procedures and provides
a logical rule of procedure. However, the joint trial in Peters resulted
in the trial of simple kidnapping, a relative felony triable by a five
man jury, by the same twelve man jury that tried the armed robbery
charge. Such a joint trial of offenses triable by different types of
constitutionally mandated juries is truly a jurisdictional defect and
21. See id. at 277, relying on LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841. See also State v. Laurent,
290 So. 2d 809 (La. 1974), where the supreme court, with justifiable objection by
dissenting Justice Barham, treated the consolidation and joint trial as "harmless
error."
22. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 920(2), cited in State v. Peters, 298 So. 2d 276, 279 (La.
1974) (Barham, J., dissenting).
23. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 495.
24. State v. Peters, 298 So. 2d 276, aff'd on rehearing, 298 So. 2d 280 (La. 1974).
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Justice Dixon's misjoinder analogy is of doubtful applicability with
regard to it. Justice Tate's concurring opinion agreed with Justice
Barham's dissent that there had not been an effective waiver and that
the defect was an error patent on the face of the record. However, he
concluded that the unauthorized joint trial was "harmless error,"
since the kidnapping conviction by an improper jury had been
quashed, and "since, as is conceded, the simple kidnapping and the
armed robbery were part of a continuous offense, the evidence on the
trial of either charge would be admissible insofar as the other formed
part of the res gestae . "..."25 Thus, even without consolidation, all
kidnapping evidence received would have been properly admissible
at the armed robbery trial."6
PROSECUTION FOR INCLUDED NON-CAPITAL OFFENSE
State v. Bray27 followed a practical and well recognized proce-
dure which is not spelled out in the Code of Criminal Procedure."8
Bray had been indicted for murder, but in view of the circumstances
of the case and the nine out of twelve verdict authorized in non-
capital trials, the state chose to prosecute for the lesser included
crime of manslaughter. This was accomplished when the court
granted the district attorney's oral motion to amend the indictment
and reduce the charge from murder to manslaughter." At the begin-
ning of the trial the original murder indictment was read to the jury,
with notice that the charge had been reduced and that the defendant
was being prosecuted for manslaughter. Defense counsel urged, on
appeal, that the reading of the original murder indictment "consti-
tuted a reference to another crime such as would require the granting
of a mistrial under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 770."1" In
holding that this contention was "wholly without merit," Justice
Barham pointed out that reference to "murder" was unavoidable in
a charge of manslaughter, such as the one at bar where "the murder
indictment itself, as modified by the state's verbal motion to prose-
cute for the lesser crime of manslaughter, was the basis for defen-
dant's prosecution.""3 As an additional supporting argument, it may
25. Id. at 280 (Tate, J., concurring).
26. Id.
27. 292 So. 2d 697 (La. 1974).
28. Id. at 701. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972
Term - Criminal Proceedure II, 33 LA. L. REv. 300, 304 (1973).
29. This authority is supported by analogy to the court's amendatory powers
under LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 487, 488.
30. 292 So. 2d at 701.
31. Id.
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be suggested that the prohibited reference to "another crime" in
article 770 is to preclude prejudicing a defendant by reference to other
criminal activity. In Bray only one criminal homicide, the one the
defendant was being prosecuted for, was called to the jury's atten-
tion.
In State v. Edwards" the reduction of the prosecution charge
from aggravated to simple kidnapping was accomplished in an even
more direct and expeditious manner. There, as in the leading case of
State v. Doucet,33 the district attorney simply proceded upon the
reduced charge by motion in open court, without any formal amend-
ment of the indictment by the trial judge. In upholding the procedure
followed, the Louisiana supreme court again, as in Doucet, stressed
the district attorney's authority to abandon the charge of the greater
crime and prosecute for a lesser generic offense. "It is, moreover,
difficult to understand," reasoned Justice Summers, "how defendant
can complain because the State will only prosecute for the lesser
included offense." 4 In this situation the reading of the original indict-
ment, as sanctioned in Bray, becomes particularly important, as it
is still the official basis of the prosecution.
SHACKLING THE DANGEROUS DEFENDANT AT TRIAL
The defendant's right to preservation of the indicia of innocence,
by freedom from shackling or other physical restraint in front of the
jury, is a relative right which must sometimes give way to security
interests and preservation of order in the courtroom. Thus, in State
v. Daniel,"5 the trial of an armed robbery defendant in handcuffs was
held to have been justified by his prior escape, attempts to escape and
violent behavior while awaiting trial. In affirming conviction of the
handcuffed defendant, Justice Sanders stressed "the defendant's vio-
lent history," and generalized that "[t]he conduct of the trial, in-
cluding the use of manacles, is within the sound discretion of the trial
judge."36 In this regard the dangerous nature of the crime charged
(armed robbery) and previous outbursts of the defendant are of high
relevance.37 In such cases the American Bar Association Minimum
Standards on Trial by Jury suggest two valuable precautions: first,
the trial judge "should enter into the record of the case the reasons"
32. 287 So. 2d 518 (La. 1973).
33. 177 La. 63, 147 So. 500 (1933).
34. State v. Edwards, 287 So. 2d 518, 526 (La. 1973).
35. 297 So. 2d 417 (La. 1974).
36. Id. at 418.
37. State v. Triplett, 285 So. 2d 532, 534 (La. 1973).
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for the restraint; and secondly, "the judge should instruct those jurors
that such restraint is not to be considered in assessing the proof and
determining guilt." 8
MISTRIAL - COMMENT ON DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TAKE THE STAND
Article 770 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enumerates certain
remarks which, when made by a judge or district attorney, are so
inherently prejudicial that they cannot be cured by an admonition to
the jury, and entitle the defendant to a mistrial when requested. The
third of these grounds for an automatic right to a mistrial is reference
to "the failure of the defendant to testify in his own defense." This
ground implements the defendant's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. The Louisiana supreme court's strict ad-
herence to this mandate is illustrated by State v. Hall,39 where the
district attorney stated in rebuttal argument that the defendant was
"[tihe type of person who would jump up in a courtroom, and yell
at a police officer when he hadn't even taken the stand.""0 In support
of the trial judge's overruling defendant's motion for a mistrial, the
state argued that "the prefatory language shows that the primary aim
of the Assistant District Attorney was to comment upon the defen-
dant's courtroom decorum and that the casual reference to the defen-
dant's failure to testify was blurred and insufficient to constitute
error."" In rejecting this argument, and an additional claim of
"harmless error," Chief Justice Sanders pointed out that it was suffi-
cient that "the comment focused attention of the jury on defendant's
failure to appear as a witness."42 In any such case, whether the refer-
ence be direct or indirect, glaring or obtuse, it is still a ground for a
mistrial per se. "We are not permitted to speculate," reasoned Justice
Sanders, "on what effect this prohibited comment had on the jury." 3
TIME FOR DELIVERY TO COUNSEL OF CoPY OF JUDGE'S WRITTEN CHARGE
The normal order of trial, as set out in article 765 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, contemplates that the judge's charge to the jury
is to follow the final arguments of the state and the defendant. In
State v. Fallon," one of the numerous alleged grounds for reversal was
38. ABA STANDARDS, TRIAL BY JURY § 4.1(c) (1968).
39. 297 So. 2d 413 (La. 1974).
40. Id. at 414.
41. Id. at 415.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 290 So. 2d 273 (La. 1974).
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the trial judge's refusal to furnish defense counsel with a copy of his
written charge prior to the closing argument to the jury. It was argued
that defense counsel's closing argument had been prejudiced by his
not knowing how the legal issues would be stated in the judge's
charge. In holding that it was "sufficient for the court to deliver a
copy of its written charge at any time prior to reading it to the jury,"
which in the instant case was "after the presentation of all evidence
and arguments," the Louisiana supreme court relied on the simple
statement of article 801 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the
copy shall be delivered "to the defendant and to the state prior to
reading it to the jury."4 5 The holding in Fallon is consistent with the
normal order of trial contemplated by article 765, and it would appear
that considerations of practicality are best served by a procedure that
does not force the judge to finalize his jury instructions until he has
heard the final arguments of counsel.
POSSIBLE PENALTY NOT A MATrER FOR JURY CONSIDERATION
In State v. Lewis," the Louisiana supreme court re-affirmed
State v. Harris"7 in holding that defense counsel may not read the
harsh armed robbery penalty provisions, and then argue the same to
the jury in an effort to secure a lesser responsive verdict of simple
robbery. Again, as in Harris, Chief Justice Sanders concluded that
These matters [penalty provisions] are foreign to the jury's func-
tion of guilt determination and, consequently, form no part of the
'law applicable to the case'. By the same token, sentence regula-
tions form no part of the applicable law to be argued by counsel
before the jury. To allow argument of these matters would inject
irrelevant considerations into the jury's deliberation of guilt.'"
Again, as in Harris, the dissenters urged that the jury was enti-
tled to know the penalty and possible consequences of a guilty verdict
as "part of the law."' 9 This approach loses sight of the respective
functions of the jury and the judge. The jury is to determine who has
45. Id. at 292.
46. 296 So. 2d 824 (La. 1974).
47. 258 La. 720, 247 So. 2d 847 (1971), discussed in, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term - Criminal Procedure, 32 LA. L. REv. 334,
342 (1972).
48. 296 So. 2d at 827, quoting from State v. Harris. Cf. State v. Sylvester, 298 So.
2d 807 (La. 1974), treating the district attorney's reference to the effects of a man-
slaughter verdict, where a juvenile was tried for murder, as "harmless error" which
could have been cured by an admonition if one had been requested.
49. 296 So. 2d at 829 (Barham, J., dissenting).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
committed the crime charged. To that end they must be instructed
as to the necessary elements of the crime charged. They must also be
given certain basic instructions as to the presumption of innocence,
the state's burden of proving each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, and other special instructions appropriate to the
defenses urged. After guilt is determined by the jury, the trial judge
imposes sentence, which must be in conformity with the penalty
authorized by the statute. Only the judge is concerned with penalty
provisions of the law. Thus to argue penalty considerations before the
jury would serve to confuse the jurors and would detract from a fair
and clear determination of the guilt issues.
A similar question was presented in State v. Blackwell,'" where
the Louisiana supreme court first overruled the Harris approach,
finding that the trial judge had committed reversible error in refusing
to instruct the jury as to the harsh armed robbery penalty. Upon
rehearing, the supreme court, with Justice Calogero writing for a 4
to 3 court, returned to its Harris position, and held that the trial
judge had not committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the
jury as to the penalty. In re-affirming the Harris formula as to the
relative functions of the jury and the judge, Justice Calogero aptly
stated, "The jury, in this state, is entrusted with the responsibility
for determining guilt or innocence .... Once the jury determines
guilt, the court imposes sentence . . . . The general view is that the
penalty is simply of no concern to the jury."'" Recognizing, however,
"that many judges in Louisiana regularly charge juries on penal-
ties,"5 the majority decision pointed out that its present holding did
not prohibit such a charge. In this regard, it may be suggested that
there is less danger of improper jury influencing from a judge's tem-
perate statement of the possible penalty (authorized, but not re-
quired, under Blackwell) than from slanted closing argument of de-
fense counsel.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy, in-
cluding the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of that
basic right, has been held applicable to state criminal proceedings via
the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3 The same
prohibition is found in the Louisiana Constitution and is fully imple-
50. 298 So. 2d 798, rev'd on rehearing, 298 So. 2d 803 (La. 1974).
51. Id. at 803-04.
52. Id. at 804 n.3.
53. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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mented by the 1966 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure." The
general formula that double jeopardy exists when the charge at the
second trial is "identical with or a different grade of the same offense
for which the defendant was in jeopardy at the first trial," was ampli-
fied by article 596 of the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure.5 5 That
article now expressly provides that double jeopardy is not limited to
prosecution for a crime which could have been a responsive verdict
in the first trial, and prohibits multiple prosecutions for continuous
offenses.
The troublesome phrase "identical with or a different grade of
the same offense" was clarified and given added meaning by two 1972
decisions of the Louisiana supreme court. In addition to obvious situ-
ations where the attempted dual prosecutions were for different
grades of the same offense, the double jeopardy prohibition was con-
strued to preclude dual prosecutions for the identical act or conduct,
shown by the same evidence, "through denominating it differently as
separate crimes."" In State v. Bonfanti,57 the defendant's prior con-
viction of simple battery, committed on the person of a juvenile, was
held to bar a subsequent prosecution for indecent behavior with a
juvenile (based on the same physical act). This prohibition of dual
trials for the same criminal conduct was a logical construction of the
phrase "identical with" in the Code of Criminal Procedure's double
jeopardy formula. In State v. Didier"l the court's opinion also stressed
the fact that the same evidence supported both criminal charges.
A further application, and actual extension, of the double jeop-
ardy concept was recently announced in State ex rel. Wikberg v.
Henderson." In Wikberg the defendant had been convicted of the
murder of a victim killed during an attempted armed robbery, on a
felony-murder theory shown by the bill of particulars. In holding that
an additional and separate prosecution for the attempted armed rob-
bery constituted double jeopardy, the Louisiana supreme court
stressed the fact that the attempted armed robbery had been an
essential element of the felony-murder conviction.'" The controlling
criterion, according to Justice Calogero, was the fact that the grava-
54. LA. CONST. art. I, §15, implemented by LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 591-98.
55. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 596. Cf. LA. R.S. 15:279 (1950).
56. For a discussion of the Didier and Bonfanti cases, see Note, 33 LA. L. REV.
474 (1973).
57. 262 La. 153, 262 So. 2d 504 (1972).
58. 262 La. 364, 263 So. 2d 322 (1972).
59. 292 So. 2d 505 (La. 1974).
60. "The only requirements for conviction are the commission or attempted com-
mission of the enumerated felony, and a resulting death." Id. at 509.
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men of the second offense (the attempted armed robbery) had been
essentially included in the offense (felony-murder) for which the de-
fendant was first tried. The attempted robbery had been part of the
crime of felony-murder, and the defendant could not be again tried
for that conduct. The Wikberg holding is expressly limited to felony-
murder prosecutions. It would not preclude a subsequent attempted
armed robbery trial if the murder had been prosecuted as an inten-
tional killing, where the state did not rely on the attempted robbery
as an element of the crime of murder. 81
In the 1974 case of State ex rel. Hebert v. Henderson2 another
double jeopardy claim was raised, but the issue was not decided by
the Louisiana supreme court. The defendant had been charged with
making an unauthorized entry into the Oustalot Ford premises and
stealing over two thousand dollars therefrom. He had pleaded guilty
on two charges. The first was simple burglary committed by the
unauthorized entry of the Ford Company premises with intent to
steal and the second, felony-theft committed by the actual stealing
of two thousand dollars. In addition to a question as to the validity
of a correction of the simple burglary sentence, 3 relator in the post-
conviction proceedings had "further alleged double jeopardy, in that
he could not be convicted of both theft and burglary arising out of
the same act and conduct, provable by the same evidence, and all
part of a continuous offense.""' The supreme court did not pass upon
this contention, since the double jeopardy claim was not challenged
by the district attorney, who was apparently satisfied with the vali-
dated burglary conviction and sentence. Thus, Justice Tate con-
cluded that "defendant's continued complaint of double jeopardy is
thus moot." 5
61. "Nor do we mean to imply that one who robs and then kills his victim may
not be prosecuted for both crimes. To do so, however, the state must prosecute the
murder indictment solely under the intentional murder, rather than the felony-
murder, paragraph of LA. R.S. 14:30." Id. at 511. If the Wikberg case had come under
the 1973 murder provisions, a first degree murder prosecution would have required
proof of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of armed robbery, thus barring a
subsequent armed robbery trial. However, if the homicide had been prosecuted as
second degree murder the Wikberg distinction between intentional and felony-murder
would have prevailed.
62. 290 So. 2d 832 (La. 1974).
63. The real issue on appeal related to correction of the burglary sentence.
Whether it be regarded as the correction of an illegal sentence, or a mere correction of
the minutes to reflect the sentencing judge's real intent, the change of the excessive
ten year sentence to a proper nine year term was clearly authorized. Id. at 834, applying
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 882.
64. Id. at 833.
65. Id. at 835.
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It is unfortunate that the supreme court did not pass upon the
double jeopardy issue, and it is submitted that dual burglary and
theft convictions would not have violated the double jeopardy prohi-
bition. The defendant committed simple burglary by the unauthor-
ized entry of the Oustalot Ford premises (building) with intent to
steal. He subsequently committed another crime, felony-theft, when
he stole over two thousand dollars after entering the building. These
two crimes were not by "the same act and conduct," nor were they
"all part of a continuous offense." Louisiana has consistently rejected
the broad "same transaction" test for double jeopardy, and followed
that view in State v. Pettle"6 when it upheld dual prosecutions for
manslaughter in killing one female bar attendant and attempted
murder of another attendant, arising out of a continuing course of
conduct. In so holding Justice Barham stated that the killing of one
victim and attempted murder of the other "were distinct and sepa-
rate offenses, albeit they arose out of what may be considered a con-
tinuing course of conduct. The gravamen of the second offense for
which defendant was held accountable clearly is not essentially in-
cluded in the first offense.""7
The situation in Hebert was unlike Wikberg, where the entire
second offense (attempted armed robbery) had been charged as an
essential element of the original felony-murder conviction. The bur-
glary and theft in Hebert arose out of the same transaction and had
some common evidence, but they were clearly separate offenses. Bur-
glary was accomplished by entry of the Ford premises with intent to
steal. No actual stealing was required. The theft consisted of subse-
quent stealing of the money, after the burglary was already a
completed crime.
CAPITAL CRIMES - LESSER RESPONSIVE VERDICTS UPHELD
In Furman v. Georgia" the United States Supreme Court set
aside a death sentence in a Georgia murder conviction, as constitut-
ing "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments, and remanded the case for re-sentencing to
life imprisonment. The full impact of this crucial 5 - 4 decision, with
separate opinions filed by the Justices, is still somewhat unclear.
However, it is significant that only Justices Brennan and Marshall
66. 286 So. 2d 625 (La. 1973), following State v. Richmond, 284 So. 2d 317 (La.
1973). Accord, State v. Thames, 261 La. 96, 259 So. 2d 26 (1972), which permitted
prosecutions for separate aggravated battery and simple criminal damage to property,
arising out of the same bar-room altercation.
67. 286 So. 2d at 628.
68. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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were ready to hold that capital punishment was per se "cruel and
unusual" by reason of its severe and degrading nature. The other
three majority Justices posited their opinions on the fact that Geor-
gia, in common with Louisiana and many other states, authorized the
jury to render a qualified verdict of guilty without capital punish-
ment. There were no statutory guidelines for the jury determination
between capital and "qualified" verdicts, and it was found that the
capital penalty was "wantonly and freakishly imposed" on poor and
minority classes, "whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society
and are unpopular."69 Justice Burger's clearly-stated dissent sug-
gested that even-handed justice must be provided if capital punish-
ment is to be upheld.
Numerous state legislatures have sought to revise their capital
punishment laws and procedures so as to conform with Furman's
uncertain standards. Louisiana's 1973 capital punishment legislation
was predicated on two cardinal principles. First, the death penalty
is mandatory for capital punishment cases. Article 817 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure was amended so as to delete the provision
which authorized the jury to render qualified (non-capital) verdicts
in capital convictions. Thus, if the defendant is found guilty as
charged, the penalty must always be capital punishment. Second, the
capital offense of first degree murder is limited to super-atrocious
homicides and crimes where effective criminal law enforcement de-
mands the death penalty.70 Other lesser criminal homicides, which
had previously been murder under the 1942 Criminal Code, were
shifted to the crime of second degree murder and carry the penalty
of life imprisonment."
In State v. Hill," the Louisiana supreme court upheld the death
penalty under the 1973 first degree murder law in a case where the
defendant had "a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm
upon more than one person."" In a clear and carefully written major-
ity opinion, Chief Justice Sanders first held that the penalty of capi-
tal punishment was "neither barbarous nor disproportionate to the
offense."7 In so holding Justice Sanders firmly concluded that, when
imposed with due process of law, there is nothing per se
69. For a more complete statement concerning the concurring majority opinions,
see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term - Criminal
Law, 34 LA. L. REV. 332, 334-35 (1974).
70. LA. R.S. 14:30 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1973, No. 109, §1.
71. LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1973).
72. 297 So. 2d 660 (La. 1974).
73. LA. R.S. 14:30(4) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1973, No. 109, §1.
74. 297 So. 2d at 661.
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unconstitutional about the imposition of capital punishment.75
Justice Sanders then disposed of the defendant's contention that
the power of the jury to render responsive verdicts for lesser non-
capital criminal homicides rendered the statute unconstitutional
under Furman. Justice Sanders pointed out that since the qualified
verdict authorization of article 817 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
had been repealed, the death sentence is mandatory if the defendant,
in a capital case, is found guilty as charged. The authorized respon-
sive verdicts of second degree murder or manslaughter, both non-
capital offenses, does not give the jury an unguided choice between
capital punishment and life imprisonment. In this regard, Justice
Sanders states,
The use of these lesser verdicts, however, is contingent upon the
jury finding insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of
first degree murder, with which he is charged. The jury is con-
cerned only with guilt. It has no sentencing function. . .. 7" 'The
sole determining factor as to which penalty will be imposed de-
pends upon the particular crime for which the jury finds the
accused guilty, if any. Therefore we conclude that there is no
discretion in the jury for the imposition of the death penalty.' 7
In determining whether to convict of first or second degree murder,
the jury has statutory guidelines in the clearly stated definitions of
those crimes, and is not "vested with unfettered discretion," as sug-
gested by Justice Barham in his dissent."8 As a matter of practicality
and sound administration of justice it would have been unfortunate
if the Louisiana supreme court had struck down possible lesser re-
sponsive verdicts and required the legislature to impose an "all or
nothing" standard for capital cases. There will be many situations
where a reasonable doubt is presented as to the existence of one of
the required elements of first degree murder, but where a clear case
of second degree murder or manslaughter is presented.
MURDER - VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER; RESPONSIVENESS OF VERDICT
UPHELD
Many responsive verdict problems have been solved by the statu-
75. Id.
76. Id. at 662.
77. Id., quoting State v. Selman, 300 So. 2d 467 (1974).
78. State v. Hill, 297 So. 2d 660, 662 (La. 1974) (Barham, J., dissenting). Accord,
State v. Selman, 300 So. 2d 467, 473 (La. 1974), upholding the death penalty for
aggravated rape.
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tory listing of responsive verdicts in article 814 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure. However, in State v. Peterson"8 appellant argued that
the listed responsive verdict of manslaughter was not a legally or
constitutionally responsive verdict to a murder charge, because mur-
der does not include the heat of passion element that characterizes
the crime of voluntary manslaughter. Justice Barham, writing for a
unanimous court, recognized that even the statutory responsive ver-
dicts must measure up to the constitutional requirement that all
elements of the responsive offense must be included in the crime
charged. However, the responsive manslaughter verdict clearly met
that test. As Justice Barham pointed out, the "sudden passion or
heat of blood," which distinguished murder from manslaughter, was
"not an additional element of the crime of manslaughter; rather, it
is a factor which exhibits a degree of culpability less than that present
when the homicide is committed without passion caused by
provocation." 8' In this regard, Justice Barham further stated,
Accepting degrees of culpability as a basis for legislating a re-
sponsive verdict is not without precedent. Section 1.08(4)(c) of
the Model Penal Code . . . provides that a defendant may be
convicted of an 'included offense' and, as one definition of an
included offense, states: *** 'An offense is so included when: ***
(c) it differs from the offense charged only in respect that *** a
lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission'.2
The A.L.I. - Barham "lesser degrees of culpability" formula for valid
responsive verdicts should achieve a just result, and should avoid
hyper-technical claims that a less culpable element of a lesser degree
of a crime is not found in the greater crime. For example, simple rape,
where the female's consent is negated by intoxication or unsoundness
of mind, presents a lesser degree of culpability than aggravated rape
where there is no consent at all.
HABITUAL OFFENDER CHARGES
Under a literal interpretation of the habitual offender law, which
permits the accusation of prior convictions to be made "at any time,
either after conviction or sentence,"83 State v. George84 upheld an
79. 290 So. 2d 307 (La. 1974).
80. LA. R.S. 14:31(1) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1973, No. 127, §1.
81. 290 So. 2d at 310.
82. Id.
83. LA. R.S. 15:529.1 (Supp. 1956).
84. 218 La. 18, 48 So. 2d 265 (1950).
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enhanced sentence where the multiple offender charge had been insti-
tuted after the defendant had fully served his original sentence. In
State ex rel. Williams v. Henderson,"5 the Louisiana supreme court
re-examined the problem and followed a Florida holding, under a
similarly phrased statute, that the multiple offender charge must be
instituted before the convicted felon has completed the sentence
which is to be enhanced." In this situation the defendant's constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial prevailed over a literal interpretation of
the language of the habitual offender statute. Justice Dixon suc-
cinctly stated,
A case must end at some point. Even persons who have been
convicted of two or more felonies must be assured, after some
passage of time, that the consequences of past criminal acts have
abated. . . . The same considerations which underlie this consti-
tutional mandate [right to a speedy trial] compel a conclusion
that upon conviction a defendant is entitled to know the full
consequences of the verdict within a reasonable time. 7
The Louisiana habitual offender law, as implemented by the
Williams decision, achieves fair and practical results. The charge of
prior felony convictions, to enhance the penalty for the latest felony,
is not included in the original indictment. To do so might unfairly
prejudice the jury by notice of the defendant's past convictions. The
charge is brought by a separate information filed with the sentencing
judge after conviction. However, Williams holds that the defendant's
constitutional right to a speedy determination of his full criminal
liability requires that the habitual offender charge be brought with
reasonable promptness, i.e., before the defendant has served the sent-
ence imposed after conviction.
Another type of habitual offender charge is involved in a number
of misdemeanors where enhanced penalties are imposed for second
and subsequent convictions." These offenses are graded as first, sec-
ond or subsequent convictions, and it is necessary to allege the prior
convictions, in the original information, to charge the defendant as a
85. 289 So. 2d 74 (La. 1974).
86. Reynolds v. Cochran, 138 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1962).
87. 289 So. 2d at 77.
88. For misdemeanors with multiple conviction felony liability, see LA. R.S.
40:966 (Supp. 1972), as amended by La. Acts 1973, No. 207, §3 (possession of mari-
juana); LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950), as amended (theft); LA. R.S. 14:69 (1950), as amended
(receiving stolen things); LA. R.S. 14:98 (1950), as amended (operating a vehicle while
intoxicated); LA. R.S. 14:99 (1950) (reckless operation of a vehicle).
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multiple offender.89 In State v. Bouzigard, ° the defendant was tried
and convicted under a bill of information that charged him with
simple possession of marijuana. On the day of sentencing, however,
the state amended the information to add allegations of prior mari-
juana convictions and to raise the offense to felony status. In setting
aside a felony sentence based on the amended information, Justice
Calogero stressed the Reporter's comment to article 483 (allegations
of prior convictions) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which, in
referring to statutes with enhanced penalties for multiple misde-
meanor offenders, stated;
There is no provision in those articles which authorizes a district
attorney to wait until after a defendant is convicted of the charge
in question to inform him that he has been prosecuted as a multi-
ple offender. In such cases the prior convictions, like the amount
of damage done in a simple arson case, is a matter to be deter-
mined in arriving at the degree of the defendant's guilt and must
be alleged in the indictment.'
In Bouzigard, the defendant had been tried upon an information that
charged only simple (first offender) possession of marijuana. The
scope of the trial was limited by the crime officially charged, and this
was not altered by the fact that the district attorney had informed
the defendant that he would be prosecuted as a second offender and
the case was tried by a five man jury. Amendment of the information
before sentence to include a charge of the prior convictions did not
help, for the defendant had not been tried on that greater charge.2
Justice Calogero concluded, "It should be noted that prosecution
under R.S. 40:966 and comparable statutes which provide for en-
hanced penalties for repeat violators is unlike prosecution under the
Habitual Offender Law, R.S. 15:529.1 which concerns itself with prior
unrelated felonies . . . which . . . form no element of the most re-
cently committed offense." 3
Justice Barham concurred in the setting aside of the sentence as
a multiple offender, under "the law as it now exists." 4 However, he
strongly urged that a procedure should be adopted whereby the jury,
89. State v. Montgomery, 250 La. 326, 195 So. 2d 285 (1967); State v. Compagno,
125 La. 669, 51 So. 681 (1910).
90. 286 So. 2d 633 (La. 1973).
91. Id. at 635.
92. See State v. Williams, 173 La. 1, 136 So. 68 (1931), holding that the entire
trial must have been on a valid and effective indictment.
93. 286 So. 2d at 636.
94. Id. (Barham, J., concurring).
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as in regular habitual offender prosecutions, would only consider evi-
dence as to defendant's guilt of the crime presently charged. To that
end, he suggests that,
The determination of whether or not there have been prior con-
victions for the same offense is a judge question. This question
could be decided before trial under a pretrial device requiring the
judge to determine if and how many prior convictions for the
same offense have been returned against the particular defen-
dant. . . . The jury would not be informed of the prior offense.
They would simply determine his guilt or innocence of the offense
charged."
It is Justice Barham's considered, and sound, opinion that the jury
should not be prejudiced in deciding the case at bar by notice of prior
convictions. It is significant that he is not stating that the Louisiana
procedure is unconstitutional," but merely that another procedure
would be better and fairer.
95. Id. at 637.
96. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), holding that while such a procedure
was not the best procedure, it was not so bad as to constitute a denial of due process.
